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Since the 1980s, many countries have passed legislation prohibiting monetary compensation for organ donation. Organ
donation for transplantation has become altruistic worldwide. During the past two decades, advances in immunosuppressive
therapy has led to greater success in transplantation and to increased numbers of patients on transplant waiting lists.
Unfortunately, the altruistic supply of organs has been less than adequate, and severe organ shortage has resulted in many
patient deaths. A number of transplant experts have been convinced that providing financial incentives to organ sources as an
alternative to altruistic organ donation needs careful reconsideration. In 1988, a compensated and regulated living-unrelated
donor renal transplant program was adopted in Iran. As a result, the number of renal transplants performed substantially
increased such that in 1999, the renal transplant waiting list was completely eliminated. By the end of 2005, a total of 19,609
renal transplants were performed (3421 from living related, 15,356 from living-unrelated and 823 from deceased donors). In
this program, many ethical problems that are associated with paid kidney donation also were prevented. Currently, Iran has
no renal transplant waiting lists, and >50% of patients with ESRD in the country are living with a functioning graft. In
developed countries, the severe shortage of transplantable kidneys has forced the transplant community to adopt new
strategies to expand the kidney donor pool. However, compared with the Iranian model, none of these approaches has the
potential to eliminate or even alleviate steadily worsening renal transplant waiting lists.
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I n the past three decades, advances in immunosuppressivetherapy and organ transplant technology have improvedpatient and graft survival rates in renal transplant recipi-
ents. Available data show that renal transplantation, not dial-
ysis, has become the treatment of choice for ESRD (1). Because
transplantation significantly prolongs patient survival and im-
proves the quality of life compared with dialysis therapy, the
number of patients who ask for a renal transplant rather than
dialysis has steadily increased. Unfortunately, the supply of
transplantable kidneys has been much less than the demand.
As a consequence, the number of patients who are on renal
transplant waiting list for deceased-donor transplantation has
increased continuously, and each year, thousands of patients
die while waiting for renal transplantation.
The main reason for this increasing number of patients who
are on the renal transplant waiting list is the steady growth of
a patient population that needs renal replacement therapy
worldwide. At the end of 2001, approximately 1,479,000 people
were alive in the world just because they had access to dialysis
and renal transplant facilities. This number increased to
1,783,000 by the end of 2004. The major factors that contribute
to this continuous growth in the number of patients with ESRD
has been explained by universal aging of populations, higher
life expectancy of treated patients with ESRD and increasing
access to dialysis and renal transplantation facilities of a gen-
erally younger patient population from developing countries.
The effective strategies to prevent increasing numbers of pa-
tients with ESRD or new treatment modalities to be either
superior or alternative to dialysis and renal transplantation are
not expected to be available at least in the upcoming decade
(2,3).
Since the 1980s, many countries have passed legislation pro-
hibiting monetary compensation for organ donation for trans-
plantation. All organ donations have become altruistic, mean-
ing that there are no financial incentives to people who are
willing to have their organs or organs of their deceased family
members used for transplants. An ethical consensus has devel-
oped around the world that there should be no payment for
transplantable organs from either living or deceased individu-
als. Unfortunately, the altruistic supply of organs has been less
than adequate, and the results of this altruistic system have met
with limited success. During the past two decades, several
approaches have been adopted to increase altruistic organ do-
nations, but the gap between supply and demand has wors-
ened over time. Some experts believe that the use of self-
interest (i.e., financial incentives) to shape human behavior is
much better understood than the use of altruism. Only under
certain and limited circumstances does the human being show
willingness for uncompensated transfers and generosity to-
ward others, whereas the forces of self-interest are basic for
almost all of our daily activities. This is the main reason that
efforts to use altruism for organ donation have met limited
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success and why by providing financial incentives to organ
sources, it is expected that the number of available organs for
transplantation will increase (4,5).
Because the organ shortage has become more severe world-
wide, some from the transplant community believe that altru-
ism alone is not enough to satisfy the needs of the thousands of
patients who are on renal transplant waiting lists and that
providing some financial incentives or social benefits is neces-
sary to increase the number of deceased or living organ dona-
tions. Some transplant clinicians also believe that prohibition of
all forms of financial incentives to organ sources should not be
considered an ethical attitude (6).
In 1988, a compensated and regulated living-unrelated donor
renal transplant program was adopted in Iran. As a result, the
number of renal transplant centers and renal transplantations
that were performed rapidly increased such that by 1999, the
renal transplant waiting lists in the country was eliminated
successfully (7,8). By the end of 2005, a total of 19,609 renal
transplants were performed. This approach eventually was
named the Iranian model renal transplant program. Currently,
Iran has no renal transplant waiting lists, and 50% of patients
with ESRD in Iran are living with a functioning graft.
In this article, first we review the backgrounds, characteris-
tics, results, and ethical issues surrounding the Iranian model
paid kidney donation program showing how the renal trans-
plant waiting list in Iran has been eliminated successfully.
Finally, we briefly discuss other strategies that have been
adopted around the world to increase organ donation, includ-
ing transplantable kidneys.
Background and Development of the
Iranian Model
Iran, in ancient Greek sources called “Persia” or “The Land of
Aryans,” had a higher degree of civilization during the entire
period of the first millennium B.C. and now is a developing
country located in the Middle East between the Caspian Sea
and the Persian Gulf. It covers 1,648,000 km2 and has 68 million
inhabitants. Iran’s gross domestic product per capita is $7219
USD with a total health expenditure of 6% of its gross domestic
product. The prevalence of patients with ESRD in Iran is ap-
proximately 25,000, or 370 patients per million.
The first renal transplantation was performed in Iran in 1967.
From 1967 to 1988, the number of patients who were undergo-
ing dialysis steadily increased, but the renal transplantation
program severely lagged in growth in comparison with dialy-
sis. Between 1967 and 1985, only approximately 100 renal trans-
plants were performed. Since 1980, because of very limited
renal transplant activity in the country, the Ministry of Health
started allowing dialysis patients to receive transplants abroad
with governmental funds. Any dialysis patient who had a letter
of acceptance from a transplantation unit abroad was accepted
as a transplant candidate and all travel and transplant expenses
were paid. As a result, a large number of patients who were
undergoing dialysis and wishing to receive a transplant created
a long renal transplant waiting list at the Ministry of Health.
Between 1980 and 1985, more than 400 of these patients trav-
eled to European countries and some to the United States using
governmental funds and received a renal transplant. The ma-
jority of these transplants were performed in the United King-
dom from living-related donors. In 1985, the high expense of
renal transplantation abroad and the increasing number of
patients who were on the renal transplant waiting list
prompted health authorities to establish renal transplant facil-
ities inside the country. Two renal transplant teams were orga-
nized, and between 1985 and 1987, a total of 274 renal trans-
plants from living-related donors were performed (7,8).
In 1988, a large number of patients with ESRD needed renal
transplant but had no living-related donor. The deceased-donor
organ transplantation program had not been established, and it
did not seem as though it would be started effectively any time
in the near future. The patients had created a long renal trans-
plant waiting list at the Ministry of Health to travel abroad with
governmental funds for transplantation. Transplantation of so
many patients abroad was very expensive and understandably
unaffordable. Therefore, a government-funded, -regulated, and
-compensated living-unrelated donor renal transplantation
program was adopted in 1988. As a result, the number of
transplant teams increased from two to 25. The number of renal
transplantations that were performed increased rapidly such
that by 1999, the renal transplant waiting list was eliminated
(7,8). By the end of 2005, a total of 19,609 renal transplantations
were carried out (3421 from living-related donors, 15,365 from
living-unrelated donors, and 823 from deceased donors). Figure
1 shows the annual number of renal transplants that were
performed in Iran from 1984 to 2005. Renal transplant activity
in Iran has reached 28 renal transplants per million per year.
More than 78% of all renal transplants have been from living-
unrelated donors.
Characteristics of the Iranian Model
In the Iranian model renal transplant program, during eval-
uation of all renal transplant candidates, the transplant physi-
cian emphasizes the advantages of living-related donor com-
pared with living-unrelated donor renal transplant and
recommends renal transplantation from a living-related donor.
He also discusses the scarcity of deceased-donor kidneys in the
country. If the patient has no living-related donor or the poten-
tial donor would not be willing to donate a kidney, then the
patient is referred to Dialysis and Transplant Patients Associa-
tion (DATPA) to locate a suitable living-unrelated donor. (Only
a transplant center at Shiraz University with active deceased-
donor liver and kidney transplantation program asks all renal
transplant candidates to wait up to 6 mo for possible deceased-
donor renal transplantation.) Those who volunteer as living-
unrelated donors also contact DATPA. All members of DATPA
are patients who have ESRD and receive no incentives for
finding a living-unrelated donor or for referring the patient and
donor to a renal transplant team (Figure 2). Currently, there are
302 dialysis units, 25 transplant centers, and 79 DATPA offices
all over the country. There is no role for a broker or an agency
in this program. All renal transplant teams belong to university
hospitals, and the government pays all of the hospital expenses
of renal transplantation. After renal transplantation, the living-
unrelated donor receives an award and health insurance from
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the government. A majority of living-unrelated donors also
receive a rewarding gift (arranged and defined by DATPA
before transplantation) from the recipient or, if the recipient is
poor, from one of the charitable organizations. The government
also provides essential immunosuppressive drugs such as cy-
closporine Neoral and mycophenolate mofetil to all transplant
recipients at a greatly subsidized and reduced price. Charitable
organizations also are very active in providing these drugs or in
paying any expenses of renal transplantation to poor patients.
Renal transplant teams receive no incentives from the recipient
or from the government’s award. The program is under the
close scrutiny of the transplant teams and the Iranian Society
for Organ Transplantation regarding all ethical issues. To pre-
vent transplant tourism, foreigners are not allowed to undergo
renal transplantation from Iranian living-unrelated donors.
Also, they are not permitted to volunteer as kidney donors to
Iranian patients. Foreigners can receive a transplant in Iran, but
the donor and the recipient should be from the same national-
ity, and authorization for such transplantation should be ob-
tained from the ESRD Office of the Ministry of Health (7,8).
Donor and Recipient Evaluation
The donor and the recipient evaluations in all transplant
centers are very similar. In our transplantation unit at the
Figure 1. Annual number of renal transplants performed in Iran from 1984 to 2005.
Figure 2. Role of Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA) on paid kidney donation program. LURD, living-unrelated
donor; LRD, living-related donor; Tx, transplantation.
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Hashemi Nejad Kidney Hospital in Tehran, the selection and
the preparation of all potential renal transplant recipients and
living kidney donors are carried out by complete clinical and
psychological evaluation as well as by performing appropriate
laboratory tests and imaging. Recently, the European Best Prac-
tice Guidelines for Renal Transplantation and the Amsterdam
Forum on the Care of the Live Kidney Donor Medical Guide-
lines are being used for this purpose (9,10). From 1986 through
2000, for all living kidney donors, a voluntary consent was
assessed by the “Donor Selection Panel,” which consists of
nephrologists, transplant surgeons, and members of nursing
staff to exclude the possibility of pressure being exerted for
kidney donation. Since 2000, the evaluation and the selection of
potential donors and recipients has been carried out indepen-
dently, first by transplant nephrologists, then by members of
the surgical team. In selecting living-related donors, priority is
given to the donor who has a better HLA match with the
recipient. For living-unrelated donor transplants, HLA match-
ing is not practical because the Iranian model is a directed
kidney donation program, so any donor who is ABO compat-
ible with the patient is accepted for evaluation.
Immunosuppressive Drugs
Before 1996, the available immunosuppressive drugs con-
sisted of cyclosporine Neoral, generic azathioprine, and pred-
nisone. Since 1996, mycophenolate mofetil has been used in-
creasingly instead of azathioprine and by 2004 has almost
replaced it. The government imports and greatly subsidizes
these essential immunosuppressive drugs (Neoral, CellCept,
azathioprine, and prednisone) and makes those available to all
transplant recipients in a very reduced price. All patients with
ESRD including renal transplant recipients belong to a group of
patients called “Patients with Special Diseases” and are eligible
for a government-provided medical insurance. As a result, the
majority of transplant recipients receive these immunosuppres-
sive drugs free. The remaining patients pay for these drugs a
little money per month. If a transplant recipient is poor and
could not afford the drugs, then the charitable organizations
will pay for it. This is one of the reasons that all patients, either
poor or rich, have equal access to renal transplantation in Iran.
For high-risk cases (e.g., those undergoing a second transplant,
those with previous high panel reactivities), induction therapy
with anti-thymocyte globulin and rarely with IL2 receptor an-
tibodies is carried out. Antirejection therapy consists of meth-
ylprednisolone (1 g/d) for 3 to 5 d and anti-thymocyte globulin
in patients with steroid-resistant rejection. IL2 receptor antibod-
ies, tacrolimus, sirolimus, and OKT3 are neither subsidized by
the government nor covered by insurance and so are very
expensive and are used very rarely. As a result, individualiza-
tion and tailoring of immunosuppressive therapy remains very
limited.
Demographics and Outcome Data of Renal
Transplantations
Unfortunately, there is no national transplant registry in Iran
to report the short- and long-term results of transplantation in
all transplant recipients and kidney donors. Most renal trans-
plant teams report their own results as single-center experi-
ences (11–13). The ESRD Office of Iran has only demographic
data but lacks the short- and long-term results of transplanta-
tion, so the results from the Hashemi Nejad Kidney Hospital (a
pioneering transplant center and one of the largest in Iran) are
given next as an example for the whole country.
Between April 1986 and January 2006, a total of 1995 renal
transplants were performed in this hospital. A total of 496
(25%) were from living-related donors, and the remaining 1499
(75%) were from living-unrelated donors. A total of 743 (37%)
recipients were female, and 1252 (63%) were male. Their ages
ranged from 8 to 68 yr. In one of our studies we reported a
significant gender disparity in living-unrelated (paid) kidney
donors (91% male, 9% female; age range 21 to 37 yr) (14).
In a recent data analysis, the overall patient survival rates
were 93.8, 87.8, and 76% and the overall graft survival rates
were 90.4, 75.4, and 52.8% at 1, 5, and 10 yr, respectively. There
were no significant differences in graft survival rates between
recipients of one HLA haplotype–matched living-related donor
and living-unrelated donor recipients (P  0.35). In living-
unrelated donor renal transplant recipients, the patient survival
rates were 93.9, 87.1, and 72.2% and the graft survival rates
were 90.5, 74.4, and 48.8% at 1, 5, and 10 yr, respectively (Figure 3).
Elimination of the Renal Transplant
Waiting List
The Iranian model of regulated paid kidney donation has
eliminated the renal transplant waiting list in the country. In
Iran, as in other developing countries, the prevalence of pa-
tients with ESRD is markedly lower compared with the prev-
alence of patients who are on renal replacement therapy in
developed countries. A major cause of this is the many patients
who are from villages and small towns and do not receive a
diagnosis and are not referred for dialysis therapy. There also is
no adopted restricting policy for accepting patients with ESRD
for renal transplantation; however, the low prevalence of pa-
tients with ESRD results in fewer numbers of transplant can-
didates. This is the main reason that the renal transplant wait-
ing list was eliminated quickly and successfully in Iran.
At the end of 2004, the prevalence of patients with ESRD was
Figure 3. Results of 1499 living-unrelated donor renal trans-
plants in Hashemi Nejad Hospital–Tehran. u, patient survival;
f, graft survival.
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2045 per million people (pmp) in Japan, 1505 pmp in North
America, 585 pmp in Europe, 380 pmp in Latin America, 370
pmp in Iran, and 190 pmp in the Middle East (3). As expected,
in countries with higher ESRD prevalence values, more patients
are on renal transplant waiting lists, and this is why a renal
transplant activity of 25 to 28 pmp has eliminated the renal trans-
plant waiting list in Iran, whereas much higher renal transplant
activities have not done so in North America and European
countries.
Ethical Issues Surrounding the Iranian
Model
The ethical issues that are related to the Iranian model of paid
kidney donation are presented in two parts. In the first part, the
ethical issues that support the Iranian model are discussed,
showing that the many ethical problems that arise from paid
kidney donation have been prevented in this transplantation
model. In the second part, several ethical problems that still
remain in Iranian model are mentioned, emphasizing that pub-
lic education and further governmental funding for living paid
kidney donors and providing some social benefits to them will
make the Iranian model ethically more acceptable. At that time,
the revised form of this kidney donation model can be imple-
mented at least in some developing countries to prevent many
patient deaths and suffering (15).
Ethical Issues Supporting the Iranian Model
As mentioned, there is no role for a broker or an agency in
this transplantation program. The association for patients with
ESRD is a charitable organization and receives no incentives
from donors or recipients. The government pays for all hospital
expenses of renal transplantation. The medical and surgical fees
for transplantation are greatly lower compared with the fees for
similar services.
All transplant candidates who are poor receive renal trans-
plantation. The elimination of renal transplant waiting lists
means that all patients with ESRD, either rich or poor, have
equal access to renal transplant facilities; otherwise, many poor
patients would remain on the renal transplant waiting list. The
main reason for this equal access is the active role of charitable
organizations that pay for many expenses of renal transplanta-
tion that the poor patients cannot afford. One of the arguments
against paid kidney donation is that the kidney donors are
almost poor and illiterate, whereas the majority of recipients
are educated and wealthy. We previously conducted a study on
500 renal transplant recipients and their living-unrelated do-
nors to determine which socioeconomic classes are receiving
transplants more from paid kidney donors (16). All of these
donors and recipients were grouped according to their level of
education, which showed no significant differences. In this
study, 6.0% of living-unrelated donors were illiterate, 24.4%
had elementary school education, 63.3% had a high school
education, and 6.3% had university training. Corresponding
levels in their 500 recipients were 18.0, 20.0, 50.8, and 11.2%,
respectively. Then they were grouped according to whether
they were poor, rich, or middle class. The results showed that
84% of paid kidney donors were poor and 16% were middle
class, and of their recipients, 50.4% were poor, 36.2% were
middle class, and 13.4% were rich. So 50% of kidneys from
paid donors were transplanted into patients from poor socio-
economic class. This finding is a clue against commercialism in
the Iranian model renal transplant program.
The paid kidney donation model did not inhibit the estab-
lishment of a deceased-donor organ transplantation program.
Since April 2000, when legislation that was passed by parlia-
ment accepting brain death and deceased-donor organ trans-
plantation, the annual number of cadaveric kidney, liver, and
heart transplants has increased steadily in the country. In 2000,
only 1.8% of all renal transplants were from deceased donors.
This increased to 12% in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 4). This slow
increase in deceased organ donation is due to infrastructural
deficiencies and cultural barriers in the country as well as to
administrative incapabilities of health authorities rather than
being all because of availability of the paid kidney donation
program.
This program probably has eliminated the many coercive
living-related donor renal transplants. Before 1988, almost all
renal transplants in Iran were from living-related donors. Since
adoption of this transplantation model, the number of living-
related donor transplants has decreased (in 2005, only 12% of
all renal transplants were from related donors). We believe that
this decreasing number has been due partly to elimination of
coercive living-related donor transplants and partly to avail-
ability of the paid kidney donation program. Because of cul-
tural reasons, coercive living-related donor renal transplants
are common in most developing countries, including Iran; we
believe that with a compensated and regulated living-unrelated
donor renal transplantation program in place, it may be more
ethical to perform a paid renal transplantation from a volunteer
living-unrelated donor than from a living-related donor or
spouse who is under some degree of family pressure or with
emotional coercion.
The Iranian model of paid kidney donation also has elimi-
nated the many illegal and commercial renal transplants. Before
1988, a number of patients who had no living-related donors
traveled India, where they received paid renal transplants. The
majority of these bought transplants were associated with
transmission of hepatitis and surgical complications. Several
other patients traveled together with their unrelated donors to
European countries and received a transplant. In a few of these
Figure 4. Sources of kidney donations in Iran in 2000 and 2005.
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cases, the transplant documents were prepared carefully as
though the kidneys were being given altruistically by living-
related donors. The adoption of the legalized and compensated
living-unrelated donor renal transplant program in 1988 elim-
inated the need for Iranian patients for commercial or illegal
paid transplants abroad. Shortly after adoption of the Iranian
model of kidney donation, several wealthy patients from Ara-
bic countries came to Iran and received transplants from Ira-
nian paid donors. Transplantations were performed by sur-
geons who, unfortunately, had no accurate understanding of
ethical issues regarding organ transplantation. A kidney mar-
ket for transplant tourism was nearly to flourish in the country.
As a result, the Iranian Society for Organ Transplantation made
a regulation and sent it to the Ministry of Health and transplant
centers that no foreigners are allowed to undergo renal trans-
plantation from Iranian kidney donors. This amendment pre-
vented the development of transplant tourism in Iran.
We previously conducted a study on nationality of transplant
recipients and kidney donors in 1881 consecutive renal trans-
plants in our center. Nineteen (1%) recipients were refugees,
and 11 (0.6%) were other foreign nationals who received kid-
neys from living-related donors or from living-unrelated do-
nors of the same nationality. Of 1881 renal transplant recipients,
18 (0.9%) also were Iranian immigrants (residing abroad for
years) who came and received kidneys from Iranian paid do-
nors. Transplantation of these 18 patients was true transplant
tourism. The scale of this form of transplant tourism is very
small (1%) in the Iranian model; however, it is under ethical
evaluation (17).
During the past two decades, because of 23 yr of civil war in
Afghanistan (1978 to 2001) and 8 yr of the Iran-Iraq war (1980
to 1988), Iran has hosted approximately 0.5 million Iraqi refu-
gees in its western provinces and approximately 2.5 million
Afghan refugees in its eastern provinces and major urban cen-
ters. The majority of these refugees have lived outside camps,
having access to the Iranian labor market and a number of
government services such as dialysis and renal transplant fa-
cilities. In June 2004, we conducted a study to investigate the
access of Afghan refugees to Iranian transplant centers as kid-
ney donors and recipients (18). At that time, 1.6 million refu-
gees still remained in Iran. This study showed that 241 refugees
had ESRD (179 were undergoing dialysis, and 62 had renal
transplantation in Iran). Kidney donors for these 62 transplant
recipients were living-related donors in nine, spouses in two,
Afghani living-unrelated donors in 50, and deceased-donor
kidney in one. Afghan refugees are among the poorest people
in the world. In 15,000 living-unrelated donor renal trans-
plantations performed in Iran, no refugee had donated a kidney
to an Iranian patient. This study concluded that transplantation
of all refugees in need and the absence of their use as kidney
donors to Iranian patients proffer strong evidence against com-
mercialism and a reason to believe that the Iranian model renal
transplantation is practiced with ethical standards. There also is
no doubt that by adoption of the Iranian model of regulated
paid kidney donation, we have prevented many patient deaths
and suffering in the country.
Ethical Problems Still Remaining in the Iranian Model
Because the amount of governmental donor award (approx-
imately $1200 USD) is not enough to satisfy the majority of
kidney donors, recipients provide rewarding gifts to donors. If
the recipient is poor, then the rewarding gift is provided by
charitable organizations. This also results in directed paid kid-
ney donation, meaning that the transplant candidate and the
volunteering kidney donor meet each other in a DATPA meet-
ing for arrangement of rewarded gifting to be paid to the donor
after transplantation. Providing sufficient financial incentives
and some social benefits to each living-unrelated donor by the
government will eliminate rewarding gifts and will make the
Iranian model a nondirected paid kidney donation program
whereby the donors and the recipients will not see and know
each other at least before transplantation. All transactions for
financial incentives will be carried out by organ procurement
organizations (OPO). The OPO will receive all governmental
donor award budgets as well as all charitable donations. The
donor will donate a kidney to the OPO and will receive all
defined financial incentives from the OPO. Because of lack of
administrative expertise in health authorities, this approach has
not yet been tested in the Iranian kidney donation model.
Unfortunately, the financial incentives to kidney donors in
the Iranian model neither has enough life-changing potential
nor has enough long-term compensatory effect, resulting in
long-term dissatisfaction of some donors. However, providing
adequate financial incentives to kidney donors and awarding
some social benefits to them will eliminate almost all long-term
dissatisfaction. Some opponents have sensationalized that the
majority of Iranian paid kidney donors have been poor and
have remained poor after kidney donation. As mentioned, in
the Iranian model of paid kidney donation, not only the ma-
jority of donors (84%) but also the majority of transplant recip-
ients (50.4%) also are from poor socioeconomic class. This na-
tional program is not adopted to upgrade the socioeconomic
class of kidney donors and is very different from commercial
transplants that are carried out in other countries.
The only social benefit that is awarded to Iranian kidney
donors is health insurance. Providing more legal and social
benefits to paid kidney donors, in addition to financial incen-
tives, will satisfy them better in the long term. When an unre-
lated donor donates a kidney to a patient with ESRD, the intent
also is to save or improve the life of another member of society.
Therefore, the society should feel an obligation to provide
compensation for this service. There are some legal and social
items of benefits for war-injured veterans in each society. Sev-
eral of these items can be legalized and offered to each kidney
donor in addition to financial incentives as a token of appreci-
ation and compensation by society (19).
Public education also is necessary to show the minimal risk
of kidney donation and better outcome of living-related donor
renal transplantation to increase the number of transplants
from living-related donors. In one of the pioneering renal trans-
plant centers in Tehran, laparoscopic live-donor nephrectomy
is being taught and performed with encouraging results to
increase the number of live kidney donations especially from
related donors (20).
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The cadaveric renal transplant activity can be increased sub-
stantially in the country if the health authorities give higher
priority to the deceased-donor organ donation program. In the
Shiraz University transplant center, where deceased-donor or-
gan procurement is in higher priority as a result of an active
liver transplant program, the number of cadaveric renal trans-
plantations is the highest in the country (21). Finally, there is a
need for establishment of a donor registry to study the long-
term medical and socioeconomic consequences on all living
kidney donors.
Other Reasons for Adopting and Continuing
Regulated Paid Kidney Transplantation in Iran
Use of Altruism Has Failed to Alleviate Organ Shortage
In the 1980s, the shortage of transplantable organs was less
severe than it is today, and the majority of transplant experts
were optimistic that altruistic organ donation would be an
effective strategy for alleviating or even eliminating organ
shortage. This was the main reason that legislation prohibiting
monetary compensation passed and organ donation became
altruistic (4,5). Now, after two decades, it has become evident
that considerable efforts to provide a sufficient supply of or-
gans through altruism have met with limited success. Because
the severe organ shortage has resulted in many patient deaths,
a number of transplant experts have been convinced that pro-
viding financial incentives to organ sources as an alternative to
altruistic organ donation needs careful reconsideration (22,23).
For example, in 2001, several legislative proposals were sub-
mitted to the US Congress to promote organ donation. These
proposals called for a donor medal of honor and a tax credit or
tax refund upon donation of an organ from a living or deceased
person. However, several influential senior experts in trans-
plantation have urged the US Congress to retain the prohibition
of monetary compensation for organ donation (24). Neverthe-
less, the previous severe condemnations by some ethicists
against paid kidney donation is softening gradually; it is pos-
sible that some type of compensated living-unrelated donor
renal transplantation also may be legalized in the United States
or other developed countries in the future.
Renal Transplantation from Living-Unrelated Donors Is
Steadily Increasing Worldwide
Because it has been shown that the outcome after living-
unrelated donor renal transplants is the same as after one
haplotype–matched living-related kidney transplants and su-
perior to the outcome after deceased-donor renal transplants
(25), in the United States, the number of renal transplants from
living donors increased by 257%, from 1812 in 1988 to 6473 in
2003. Kidney donation increased substantially in all living do-
nor groups, but the greatest increase was in altruistic, non-
spousal living-unrelated donors. It is interesting that the per-
centage of living donors who were either spouse or unrelated to
the recipient increased from 5% in 1988 to 33% in 2003 (26). In
other countries, such as Canada, the number of living-unrelated
kidney donors also has increased (27). Because the number of
uncompensated living-unrelated donors has been very limited
in Iran, the paid kidney donation program has been adopted to
use this viable source of transplantable kidneys.
Proposals of Some Ethicists Regarding Shortage of Transplantable
Kidneys Are Disappointing and Unacceptable
Even though so many patients worldwide die or suffer on
dialysis needing renal transplantation, there still are many eth-
icists from developed and developing countries who are
against compensated renal transplantation. These ethicists who
support only altruistic organ donations have proposed that in
developed countries, the solution is to increase renal transplant
activity by accepting marginal donors or by passing presumed
consent law, but the renal transplant waiting list is increasing
steadily in developed countries, and many patients continue to
die while waiting for a renal transplant. In the United States,
the number of patients who are on the renal transplant waiting
list increased from 23,604 in 1988 to 80,492 in 2003. The number
of patients who died while waiting for a renal transplant also
increased from 1133 (4.8%) in 1988 to 3944 (4.9%) in 2003 (28).
In developing countries, the proposals of most transplant eth-
icists have been mainly to establish a Western model for de-
ceased-donor organ transplantation with high renal transplant
activity, but many infrastructural deficiencies (along with cul-
tural barriers) in these countries prevent such a large-scale
cadaveric renal transplantation program. Second, they propose
to increase further living-related donor renal transplants, which
surely will result in transplantation with coercion, particularly
in female donors, a situation that is more unethical than the use
of paid living kidneys. In a study by Muthusethupathi et al. (29)
from India, in 125 first-degree related donor renal transplanta-
tions, 66% of kidney donors but only 17% of recipients were
female.
Results of the Iranian Model of Paid Kidney Transplantation
Are Encouraging
As mentioned, the patient and graft survival rates are the
same as the results from conventional transplant centers. The
donor morbidity and mortality also are comparable to interna-
tional data. In more than 18,000 live-donor nephrectomies that
were performed in Iran, there have been four (0.02%) periop-
erative donor mortalities in the whole country. This mortality
rate is similar to what has been reported from the world’s large
series (30–32). The major and minor perioperative complica-
tions reported from our center were 1.5 and 8.5%, respectively
(33). The long-term risks of kidney donation have not been
studied in our center. There is a need for donor registry and
funding. Only a few European transplant centers have living
kidney donor registries. In the United States, even though more
than four times the number of Iran live kidney donations are
performed each year, the live kidney donor registry and the
long-term outcome data in all living kidney donors are lacking.
Some studies have shown the lower risk for long-term mor-
tality compared with an age- and gender-matched background
population. This increased survival is not surprising because
kidney donors are positively selected and screened for diseases
(34). However, the effect of kidney donation on the long-term
outcome of living donors has always been studied in terms of
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increased renal death or renal morbidities. A long-term fol-
low-up on a large number of living donors is necessary to
ensure, for example, that kidney donation and drop of GFR has
not predisposed living donors to increased cardiovascular
events.
Regulated Paid Kidney Transplantation Has Prevented
Illegal and Commercial Transplantations in Iran
Currently, all transplant candidates and their families are
well informed that one’s quality of life with a renal allograft is
greatly improved over living with chronic dialysis (1) and that
renal transplantation from living-unrelated donors is superior
to that of deceased-donor transplants (25). It also has been
shown that the shorter the period on dialysis, the better the
patient and graft survival rates (35). For these reasons, many
patients with ESRD want to receive a transplant quickly from
living donors, rather than wait for years to receive a deceased-
donor kidney. Some patients from developed countries are
traveling abroad to buy kidneys from strangers in developing
countries. Because of the shortage of transplantable kidneys
and facing long waiting lists, some patients also have turned to
Internet sites that offer the matching with living-unrelated kid-
ney donors. Several patients have received transplants from
donors that they found through www.MatchingDonor.com
(36).
Iranian Model Is Very Different from Commercial
Transplantations Carried out Elsewhere
Unfortunately, much of the transplant community’s experi-
ence with paid kidney transplantation is from centers that have
approached it with little regard to ethical standards. Before
1995, several thousand unregulated paid renal transplants were
performed in India each year. The kidneys were sold by mid-
dlemen to wealthy patients who came not only from India but
also from overseas. Poor donors were exploited by brokers and
transplant teams, who received a major part of the money that
came from the kidney sale. Almost all of these transplants were
performed in private back-street clinics with incomplete donor
and recipient evaluation and resulted in high incidence of
surgical complications and transmission of infections (37,38).
The Iran model of a regulated transplant program involves
paid kidney donation, but the ethical aspects are strictly en-
forced by the transplant teams and the Iranian Society of Organ
Transplantation.
Other Successful Strategies for Expanding
the Kidney Donor Pool
The rapidly increasing number of patients who are on renal
transplant waiting lists has forced the transplant community to
look at new strategies to increase the number of transplantable
kidneys. These strategies are as follows: Encouraging live-do-
nor renal transplantation (from genetically related and emo-
tionally motivated donors); passing presumed consent law; use
of extended criteria (marginal) and non–heart-beating de-
ceased donors (NHBDD); performing ABO-incompatible,
paired-exchange renal transplantations; and accepting nondi-
rected kidney donations. All of these strategies have been ef-
fective in expanding the kidney donor pool on a limited scale,
but compared with Iranian model, none of these approaches
has the potential to eliminate or even alleviate renal transplant
waiting lists.
By using several strategies, the number of kidney transplants
from living and deceased donors markedly increased during
the past two decades. In the United States, the significant
increase in renal transplant activity was due to the use of
kidneys from living-related and living-unrelated donors. Renal
transplants from living donors increased by 257%, from 1812 in
1988 to 6473 in 2003 (26). The largest increase was in kidney
transplants from spouses and living-unrelated donors. The
spousal transplants that led to the increase in unrelated donor
renal transplants grew from 1995 to 2000. Since 2000, this has
stabilized at approximately 700 transplants per year. The sub-
stantial increase was in the number of nonspousal, unrelated
donor transplants, which grew by 1600%, from 73 in 1994 to
1250 in 2003 (39). The deceased-donor renal transplants in-
creased only by 34%, from 7284 in 1988 to 9765 in 2003 (26).
Nearly all of this modest increase came from acceptance of
marginal or extended-criteria donors (ECD). However, the ECD
renal transplants are associated with poorer outcomes. Even the
ECD renal transplantation is no longer a rapidly growing
source; it increased in the United States from fewer than 200 in
1988 to only 1200 in 2002 (40).
The use of NHBDD has grown since the report of their
effectiveness was published (41). The rate of NHBDD kidney
transplants varies from one country to another. This number
increased in the United States from 106 in 1995 to 414 in 2003
(26). In Japan, the number of renal transplants from deceased
donors is small, and most of these are from NHBDD (of 1324
deceased-donor kidney transplants, 45 were from heart-beating
deceased donors and 1274 were from NHBDD) (42). In The
Netherlands, during the past decade, the number of NHBDD
kidney transplants has increased remarkably. Surprising, the
number of heart-beating kidney transplants has diminished at
the same rate, so the total number of annual renal transplants
from deceased donors has remained the same. In Germany,
transplantation from NHBDD is prohibited (43).
In countries such as Spain, Austria, Belgium, and Singapore,
with “presumed consent” legislation, the rate of organ donation
and kidney transplantation has increased substantially. This
law mandates that every adult individual who dies is a poten-
tial donor unless during his life he specifically declines to
participate (44). The proposal of presumed consent was not
tested for its effectiveness in the United States and many other
countries because it is considered against the autonomy of
families of deceased donors.
Currently, the Spanish model, which was established in 1989,
is the most successful deceased-donor organ donation pro-
gram. The success of the Spanish model is not due to passing
presumed consent law in Spain, because relatives of all poten-
tial donors must be approached and they can refuse organ
donation. The success and the uniqueness of the Spanish model
is its realistic approach of providing hospitals with specific
budgets for organ donation and mandating the placement of
trained staff who are responsible for the donation process (45).
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Most of these staff are physicians, mainly intensive care unit
specialists, and they belong to the staff of the hospital. They
generally continue in their medical role, but as transplant co-
ordinators, their main objective is to improve the organ dona-
tion rate. There also is increasing attention to enhance public
education about organ donation. Since 1989, the Spanish model
has increased dramatically the number of organ donors. This
model has been so effective that the organ donation rate has
increased by 100% in 10 yr (46). However, the Spanish model
has not eliminated or alleviated renal transplant waiting lists.
As a result of the severe shortage of transplantable kidneys,
some transplant centers now are performing ABO-incompatible
living-donor renal transplants. This type of renal transplanta-
tion is costly, limited in number, and associated with more
acute rejection episodes compared with ABO-compatible renal
transplants (47).
Some transplant centers also are accepting volunteering al-
truistic strangers who are willing to donate a kidney to anyone
who is in need. The large experience with a nondirected kidney
donor program belongs to the University of Minnesota group.
From 1997 to 2003, they received calls from 362 individuals for
kidney donation. After a careful evaluation, only 23 (6%) finally
were accepted and donated kidneys (48). In most developed
countries, several of these strategies are being used to increase
the kidney donor pool, but in none of these countries have renal
transplant waiting lists been eliminated.
Currently, much of the research activities are focused, and
funding is spent on xenotransplantation, genetic engineering of
organs, and human embryonic stem cell studies that all have
the potential to revolutionize organ transplantation by making
a sufficient number of transplantable organs available. Unfor-
tunately, none of these approaches is expected to be applicable
in clinical transplantation in the upcoming decade. Until that
time, the adoption of some regulated models of paid organ
donation similar to the Iranian model can eliminate success-
fully renal transplant waiting lists and save many lives.
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